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Rußlands Wirtschaftstransformation – Ergebnisse und Aussichten 
Anhaltendes Wachstum ist unter Vorbehalten möglich 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 16/2000 
Kurzfassung 
Vorbemerkung 
Die Transformationskrise in Rußland war schmerzhafter als die Große Depression in den 
USA, weil schwere Schocks die Komponenten der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage in den 
90er Jahren massiv beeinträchtigten. Doch neueste Daten belegen eine deutliche 
Wirtschaftserholung und führen zu Irritationen, da verschiedene Erklärungshypothesen 
aufgestellt werden können. Eine geht von einem vorübergehenden Produktionswachstum aus, 
das durch ein temporäres Zusammenspiel günstiger makroökonomischer Faktoren bewirkt 
werde. Ein anderes Erklärungsmuster beruht auf der Überzeugung, bei der derzeitigen 
Stabilisierung handle es sich um eine Dauererscheinung die aus verbesserten 
Fundamentaldaten herrühre. Ein wachsendes Vertrauen in die Fähigkeit der Regierung die 
Wirtschaft zu lenken nähre den Optimismus von Investoren und Verbrauchern, und treibe die 
Produktion voran. Es ist dennoch nicht einfach, sich für die eine oder andere Hypothese zu 
entscheiden, da die Fakten beide zugleich erhärten können. 
Ergebnisse 
1. Der Rückgang der Investitionsnachfrage, die den Wirtschaftszyklus primär bestimmt, 
macht deutlich warum der Produktionsrückgang so massiv war. 1992 leitete man markt-
wirtschaftliche Reformen ein, aber die Investitionsrate begann zu sinken und erst 1999 
scheint der Rückgang gestoppt worden zu sein. Die Investitionsnachfrage reagiert 
gewöhnlich auf den Zinssatz, was bedeutet, daß die Zinspolitik die Investitionen attraktiv 
machen muß. Das gelingt nicht immer – bei unzureichender Zinselastizität der 
Inverstitionsnachfrage werden Investitionen selbst bei niedrigen Zinssätzen manchmal 
unterlassen. Insbesondere in den frühen 90er Jahren waren die realen Zinssätze in 
Rußland deutlich unter Null – ausgerechnet in der Phase des gravierendsten 
Investitionsrückgangs. In einem solchen Fall sind die Möglichkeiten der Geldpolitik – wie 
das russische Beispiel belegt – begrenzt. 
2. Doch auch die Finanzpolitik scheiterte: Über mehrere Jahre gab das Budget mehr aus als 
es einnahm, aber die Investoren verglichen die alternativen abgezinsten Renditen und 
mieden das Investieren in den realen Sektor. Banken, Investmentfunds und 
Privatpersonen zogen es dagegen vor, aus den hohen Zinsen der Regierungsanleihen 
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Nutzen zu ziehen. Interessanterweise scheint die viel kritisierte hohe 
Unternehmensbesteuerung etwaige Investitionsentscheidungen weniger zu entmutigen; 
was mehr stört in Rußland ist die willkürliche Besteuerung und das unzuverlässige 
Steuerrecht. 
3. Der Produktionsrückgang und die allgmeine Steuerhinterziehung hatten massive Ausga-
benkürzungen und eine Rückführung der Staatsquote zur Folge. Das zog eine 
Reduzierung der Gesamtnachfrage und dadurch der Wirtschaftsleistung nach sich. 
Beispielsweise bewirkt eine Kürzung des Staatsverbrauchs um einen Rubel ceteris paribus 
einen Produktionsrückgang von bis zu drei Rubel. Andererseits konnten die 
Transferzahlungen der Behörden den Ausgabenrückgang teilweise ausgleichen, da die 
Transfers zwischen 1992 und 1998 real um 45% zugenommen haben. Sie haben die 
Reaktion der aggregierten Nachfrage auf die Kürzung des Staatsverbrauchs 
abgeschwächt, so daß der kombinierte Effekt ein Rückgang der Wirtschaftsleistung um 
ca. 39% in 8 Jahren gewesen sein dürfte. 
4. Der Privatverbrauch verringerte sich real weniger als die Wirtschaftsleistung. Weil er aber 
den Löwenanteil an der Gesamtnachfrage aufweist, zieht sein Rückgang unweigerlich 
eine Produktionskürzung nach sich. Auch die Umverteilung des Volkseinkommens 
zugunsten der "neuen Reichen" hatte keinen positiven Effekt auf die aggregierte 
Nachfrage, d.h. die viel beachtete Geldverschwendung der Systemwechselgewinner hat 
die Wirtschaft nicht ankurbeln können. Weil die Einkommensschwankungen und die 
allgemeine Unsicherheit in Rußland relativ lange, etwa 10 Jahre, anhielten, dürfte es 
einiger Zeit dauern (es sei denn ein furioses Wachstum setzt ein) um das Vertrauen der 
Verbraucher wiederherzustellen und das Wirtschaftswachstum zu beschleunigen. Eher 
wird ein zögerliches Anpassen des Konsums an das Einkommen auch eine langsame 
Reaktion der Produktion auf die Ausgabenerweiterung bewirken; erst wenn die 
Einkommensverbesserung als dauerhaft perzipiert worden ist, kann ein schnelles 
Wachstum zustande kommen. 
5. Im Unterschied zu den anderen Komponenten der aggregierten Nachfrage halfen die Aus-
fuhren die Krise abzumildern oder schneller zu überwinden. Die überdurchschnittliche 
Bedeutung des Exportsektors ergibt sich z.Zt. aus dem beachtlichen Exportmultiplikator. 
Zugleich weist Rußland prozentual zum Inlandsprodukt recht hohe Leistungsbilanzüber-
schüsse auf, was auf entgangene Investitionschancen hinweist, da ein Teil der 
inländischen Ersparnis im Ausland angelegt wird. Eine die ausländischen 
Direktinvestitionen fördernde Privatisierungspolitik wäre dazu geiegnet, das Wachstum zu 
beschleunigen und die Nettoexporte zugunsten einer größeren inländischen 
Investitionsrate zu reduzieren. 
6. Nachfrageseitig geprägte Schritte der Zentralbank führten zu einem Rückgang der 
Monetisierung der Wirtschaft. Das weist auf lediglich beschränkte Möglichkeiten des 
Bankensystems hin, die Geldmenge via Bereitstellung von inländischem Kredit zu 
erweitern. Die Sparer scheinen nur ungern ihr Geld den Banken anzuvertrauen, da die 
realen Einlagezinsen entweder gering oder negativ sind. Die Zinselastizität der Nachfrage 
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nach Bankeinlagen ist gegenwartig kleiner Eins, d.h. das Publikum erachtet die Einlagen 
als inferiore Güter von nachlassender Bedeutung. Ein geringes Bargeld-Einlagen-
Verhältnis verringert die Geldmenge und hindert die Investitionen. Die Banken bieten 
niedrige Einlagezinsen wegen hoher Refinanzierungskosten, die durch die Zinspolitik der 
Zentralbank verursacht werden. Noch bis 1998 gaben sie diese Kosten an die Kunden 
weiter, indem sie auch hohe Kreditzinsen verlangten, die die Wirtschaft lähmten. 
7. Etwas unerwartet begann die Wirtschaft 1999 zu wachsen. Das ist entweder eine Folge 
exogener Faktoren (Mitnahmeeffekte der steigenden Rohstoffpreise und der Rubelabwer-
tung), oder zyklischer Erholung. Während die exogenen Faktoren als vorübergehend zu 
betrachten sind, könnten die zyklischen Effekte von anhaltender Bedeutung sein. Bei 
näherer Analyse der Komponenten der Gesamtnachfrage kommen jedoch Zweifel auf, ob 
der verbesserte Zustand der Wirtschaft auch wirklich von Dauer ist. Die Untersuchung der 
Investitionsnachfrage deutet nicht darauf hin, daß die Unternehmen mit besseren 
Wirtschaftsaussichten rechnen und den Kapitalstock zu erweitern beabsichtigen. Der 
private Konsum hat sich auch nicht erholt und kann demnach das Wirtschaftswachstum 
kaum ankurbeln. 
8. Unter diesen Bedingungen erlangen die Ausgaben des Staates und die Exporte entschei-
dende Bedeutung. Beide stiegen an und scheinen die Gesamtnachfrage aufrecht erhalten 
zu haben. Für den Fall daß sich die temporären exogenen Faktoren abschwächen, werden 
die Staatsausgenen – ceteris paribus – wegen der klaren Budgetbeschränkung sinken 
müssen. Das könnte zusammen mit einer möglichen Verschlechterung des Export-Import-
Preisverhältnisses (terms of trade) und einem starken Rubel die Wachstumsaussichten 
unterminieren. 
9. Auch die Entwicklung des Geldangebots kann nicht ein herannahendes stetiges 
Wachstum belegen. Ein expandierendes Geldangebot spiegelt normalerweise das 
Vertrauen der Anleger wieder, woraufhin Ersparnisse dem Bankensystem zugeführt und 
der Wirtschaft oder den Haushalten ausgeliehen werden. Die langsame und unzulängliche 
Wiederherstellung des Bargeld-Einlagen-Verhältnisses steht für eine anhaltend niedrige 
Sparquote der privaten Haushalte, aber auch für Mißtrauen in das Bankensystem 
angesichts der verheerenden Erfahrung der Sparer in den 90ern, und der weiterhin 
negativen Habenzinsen. Mehr noch, die Zentralbank versorgte kürzlich die Banken mit 
Liquidität, die sie nicht ausleihen können. Die hohen Überschußreserven und die damit 
verbundenen höheren Pflichtreserven stützen die Kreditrationierung via kleineren 
Geldmultiplikator und trüben die Wachstumsaussichten. Während in der Vergangenheit 
eine lockere Geldpolitik lediglich Inflation auslöste, vermag sie auch gegenwärtig nicht 
die Wirtschaft zu beschleunigen. 
10. Es ist folglich nicht einfach einzuschätzen, ob das gegenwärtige Wachstum von Dauer ist 
oder nicht. Da die exogenen Faktoren als unsicher zu betrachten sind, müssen die zykli-
schen Faktoren – insbesondere das Vertrauen der Investoren und Konsumenten – zulegen. 
Andernfalls dürfte sich die derzeitige Wirtschaftsbelebung bald erschöpft haben. 
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1. The macroeconomic results after ten years of transition 
When thinking of the transitional depression in Russia, one might seek similar events to 
compare it with, and might recall the Great Depression. The Great Depression hit the US 
economy harder than any other crisis in its whole history. Triggered in 1929, the fall in output 
reached 30 percent within the next four years. Ten years in a row – between 1931 and 1941 – 
the average unemployment rate stayed at almost 19 percent, and the capital stock eroded and 
decreased because net investment was negative during the early 1930s. The stock market con-
tracted to merely 20 percent of its pre-crisis value, and simultaneously the money stock shrank, 
too, causing an unprecedented deflation – by 1940 the price level was about 20 percent lower 
than in 1929. The most striking development, however, was the rapid growth in output as of 
1934, which by the end of the 1930s had made up the initial losses (though neither unemploy-
ment nor the stock market recovered to the same extent). 
The crisis in Russia developed quite differently: growth in output did not resume earlier than 
ten years after the crisis became obvious, and current real growth seems to be insufficient to 
restore the pre-crisis GDP soon (Diagram 1). 
Diagram 1: Output index in Russia 1989-2000 and the US 1929-1940 
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2000 estimated. Sources: Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, Southampton, vari-
ous issues Table 1; US Department of Commerce, The National Income and Product Accounts, various issues. 
While in the US prices crumbled in response to the Fed's1 tough monetary policy, inflation in 
Russia skyrocketed, melting away the savings of the population and causing a massive ruble 
devaluation index of roughly 50 thousand between 1991 and 1999. The composition of the 
                                                 
1 The Federal Reserve System (Fed) is the US Central Bank with its Washington, D.C., based Board of Gover-
nors. 
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Russian gross domestic product (hereafter GDP) by sectors and regions also changed drama-
tically – the predominance of heavy industry was replaced by an expanding service sector, 
whereas subsidized mining and raw material processing regions suddenly lost their economic 
base, as budget transfers had to be cut. Although on paper the unemployment rate is still not 
high by international standards, a large portion of the labor force is idle. 
The shocking balance of the transitional recession raises the question as to the reasons, 
although Russia is no exception: a whole range of post-communist economies (Ukraine, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria) experienced a similar, or deeper, slump in their output and even some 
Asian emerging markets collapsed massively in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. But 
Russia differs in a way from other – either small or large, but less industrialized – nations 
such as the Baltic republics or Indonesia. The difference arises from the macro-economic 
facts: a large domestic market, well-skilled labor force, abundant natural resources, and last 
but not least significant expenditure relief stemming from a lower defense burden on the new, 
democratizing, country. As the former Soviet Union broke up, many observers believed that 
Russia would achieve a fast transition from a command to a market-based economy. 
Theoretically, more complex and less open economies are able to rely more strongly on their 
own resources, avoiding the adjustment distress that smaller nations face when forced to open 
up to the world market. The per-capita income level in Russia, admittedly, may have been 
lower than in the advanced economies, yet it would have been higher than the income actually 
turned out to be. 
One of the first steps the new reformist government of prime minister Gaydar undertook in 
1992 was, however, to abolish the state monopoly on trade and to change exchange rate 
policy towards a market-determined value of the ruble.2 In terms of its trade in goods, Russia 
became an open economy, and an opening up in terms of capital flows followed closely. This 
provoked a long list of mismatches – low, centrally set domestic prices suddenly compared 
with higher world-market prices; low-quality domestic commodities had to compete with 
high-quality imported goods; the market-set exchange rate differed many times from the 
exchange rate at purchasing power parity; and so forth. Why did the Russians make these 
mistakes, instead of trying a gradual adjustment before exposing the economy to such external 
shocks? The answer is, they had to wrestle with several severe domestic shocks, too: the 
disintegration of the former Soviet Union crippled demand-side policies, as it left the State 
Bank (Gosbank, the USSR central bank) helpless in the face of the autonomous money supply 
practices of the republics, who spontaneously started demanding soviet ruble credits3 on 
behalf of their budgets and thus decentralizing the overall money supply. Central Bank of 
Russia credits to the Commonwealth of Independent States went on until 1994, when they 
were finally discontinued. On the supply side, a worn-out industrial capital stock and a 
logistic mess failed to match the requirements of the consumers, entailing supply shortages; 
                                                 
2 Nevertheless, a multiple exchange rate existed until 1993. 
3 Anders Åslund: Why Has Russia's Economic Transformation Been So Arduous? Annual World Bank Con-
ference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 28-30, 1999, p. 5, in: www.worldbank.org/re 
search. 
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tax collection, and thus payment flow, collapsed, and increasingly provoked industrial 
standstill, etc. In short: a mix of demand and supply-side shocks occurred, and economic 
policy was confused as to how to handle them. 
The most convincing answer to the question of how to respond might have been to ignore the 
pressure for system conversion and to continue producing the old way with some gradual 
opening. Some see China's reforms since Deng Xiaoping urged the Chinese to get rich as con-
firming such a proposition. But with the benefit of hindsight we now know this was not 
possible, bearing in mind the differences in the starting conditions between the two countries. 
While China in the late 1970s and the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s realized the need for 
reforms, central decision-making was still more or less functioning in China. Not so in the 
USSR: perhaps due to Gorbatchev's reform attempts, a tendency to abandon the old system 
prevailed within society, weakening the decision-making power of the central authorities. The 
ensuing disintegration of the Union provoked a disruption of the technological links and 
financial flows, as the union republics and regions increasingly refused to "export" (except in 
return for hard currency), thus cutting off supply from demand and boosting the overall dis-
array. Another strong incentive for changes resulted from the shift in influence: a 
redistribution of power was under way, disadvantaging hitherto privileged groups such as the 
military, the Soviet-style "nomenklatura", and so forth, while strengthening other groups 
linked directly to the economy. The most startling examples are the infamous oligarchs and the 
red managers of the state-owned companies, but new private entrepreneurs made their 
fortunes, too, by drawing benefit from the general uncertainty prevailing at that time. 
2. Aggregate demand by components 
The so-called "young reformers" faced huge demand-side distortions that they had to handle 
quickly. To outline the challenge, a review of the components of aggregate demand helps to 
determine those which contributed most to the decline in output. As fluctuation of investment 
demand accounts strongly for the business cycle, the analysis will start with investment. The 
next demand component reviewed will be government spending, because theory suggests that, 
during a crisis, more purchases and transfers usually manage to revitalize the economy. The 
analysis goes on with private consumption. Consumption decisions reflect the past experience 
of the households and therefore depend on the consumers' sentiment. Finally, exports, which 
are considered as an exogenous demand component, will be analyzed. Notwithstanding this, 
exports often prove decisive in overcoming a recession, especially when the export/output 
ratio is high. 
2.1 Investment demand 
Since the Stalinist-launched industrialization, the Russians have always relied on a high 
investment rate to achieve real growth. Typically, they mobilized resources by keeping 
private consumption down, while strictly restricting capital outflows. On average, the former 
Soviet Union sustained an investment rate of some 24 percent of GDP, which enabled output 
growth at rates between 8 and 2 percent in the USSR's dawn years, and in the 1980s, 
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respectively. The decline in the growth rates is explained by the fall of the total factor 
productivity (TFP) during the last decades, that is to say, technical progress (modernization) 
has been contributing less and less to output expansion. In spite of the overall productivity 
loss, the capital stock appears to have always been quite modern in some sectors such as 
defense or space, where costs hardly mattered. Simultaneously, other (civilian) sectors 
suffered from an aging capital stock and lack of efficiency. The ebbing productivity gains are 
seen as an important contribution to the demise of the planned economy, as society became 
more and more frustrated with the disappointing results of the economic endeavors the 
communists demanded. Anyway, the public discussion on perestroyka stressed the need for a 
radical system change to catch up with the level of the West, which meant a change in property 
rights and, consequently, freedom to allocate capital more efficiently. Disappointingly, though 
the transition reform really got started in 1992, the fixed investment rate began to fall and the 
capital stock declined while deteriorating in quality (Diagram 2). 
Diagram 2: Investment and capital stock index, 1990 = 100 
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2000 estimate. Source: Institute of macroeconomic forecasting: Ekonomika Rossii v nastupayustim desetiletii, 
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1999, p. 10, 20. 
The investment spending decline seems to have bottomed out in 1999, strengthening hopes of 
recovery. Because of the very low level in real terms – only about 20 percent of the amount 
spent in 1990 – the investment rate can be calculated at about 8 percent of GDP at this 
moment – clearly a poor result by international standards.4 
When they plan to increase output, firms want to invest to raise the capital they have on hand. 
Investment demand usually responds to interest rates, and because it is negatively correlated 
                                                 
4 Calculated assuming a 20 percent investment rate in 1990. In 1999 the investment index was 20 percent and 
the GDP index 50 percent, respectively, which means an investment level of 40 percent of the 1990 level 
(20/0.5). 40 percent of the 20 percent investment rate yields 8 percent actual investment rate. 
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to a higher interest burden, the latter discourages investors. In such a situation the monetary 
authorities are expected to lower the interest rates to make investment attractive. The result 
depends, however, on the sensitiveness of investment demand to the interest rates – some-
times high rates might not lead to a large decrease and, what is even more important, low rates 
may not always strongly encourage investors. Pessimistic business sentiment may make 
investors reluctant to expand fixed capital and may thus harm growth prospects. In the early 
1990s, especially, real interest rates, the indicator which de facto is important to investors, 
were clearly below zero in Russia – just in the phase of the most precipitous decline in 
investment spending. Under such circumstances, the opportunities open to monetary policy – 
as the Russian experience proves – are limited. 
If monetary policy does not produce any definite encouraging effects on the investors' 
decisions, overall fiscal policy becomes crucial. While in the short run more government 
spending may increase aggregate demand and help output to recover, increasing deficit 
spending provokes growing budget imbalances. In the early 1990s, the deficits were large, yet 
had no positive effect on GDP growth. Instead, an adverse result occurred: deficit financing 
by borrowing usually moved up interest rates and crowded out private investment in fixed 
capital. This became increasingly unattractive, as investors compared the expected discounted 
returns of other, alternative, investment opportunities – in real-economy projects or in 
government bonds and exchange rate speculations – and mostly avoided putting money into 
factories. Instead, banks, investment funds and private persons rushed to take advantage of the 
high interest rates offered by government bonds. In 1996, the real returns from such 
investment still reached an attractive 60 percent per year – a really unthinkable yield for a 
"normal" firm producing goods in a competitive market. 
The portfolio investment rationale eroded the propensity to invest in the capital stock in two 
ways: firstly, foreign capital and know-how stayed away from Russia's industrial sector, as 
they were crowded out by the demand for funding the Federal Government in Moscow. 
Secondly, the new private owners of the former Soviet assets quickly figured out that any 
efforts to modernize, restructure, and produce would not be suitably rewarded, as higher 
returns could be obtained by converting tangible assets into financial assets. 
The result was disastrous: obviously, the investment decline is linked mainly to the decision 
of the new owners of the business assets to disinvest, which cut aggregate demand and 
provoked an economic depression. Moreover, it left firms short of fixed capital. Disinvestment 
started within a highly uncertain environment, when the big state-owned companies faced 
increasing difficulties in producing and selling. Thus, by accruing a growing debt (liabilities) 
the net value of such companies diminished. For clever entrepreneurs it was cheaper to 
register a private trade company, buying the low-priced output of the industry dinosaurs and 
selling it at market prices. The reverse was practised too: selling inputs at high prices and 
buying final goods for pennies. The owners of the new companies were either the red 
directors of the state enterprises or their relatives or business partners, which helped to 
eliminate competition and price setting according to market rules. The same persons resisted a 
legal move towards fast privatization and thus accelerated the asset-stripping of the soviet-
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style economy. Investment in fixed capital was not worthwhile, because firms remained state 
property. On the other hand, the new companies were low-capital trade-sector firms and 
therefore promised high profits at less risk. Ideologically, the postponed privatization and 
opening of the stock exchange for foreigners were defended as a social and patriotic step to 
prevent Russia's sell-off to rich foreigners. 
Meanwhile some Russian businessmen have became very rich, too, and are able to interfere 
with the policies of the Federal Government. In an infamous insider debt-for-equity swap in 
1995, money tycoons obtained stakes in key industrial enterprises, which were paid for with 
inflated private bank credits to the budget. Neither experienced in running those industries 
(mostly oil extraction and non-ferrous metallurgy), nor willing to attract management know-
how and advanced technology from the West, they even accelerated the companies' demise by 
siphoning out money and transferring it overseas. When this became obvious, the values of 
these companies fell sharply below the already low purchasing prices. For instance, Norilsk 
Nickel, the large non-ferrous-metal company is now worth one third as much as Oneximbank 
paid for it in a non-competitive deal in late 1995.5 
Fluctuations in investment spending reflect the expectations of the firms, which feel 
persuaded to invest only if they anticipate a long-term sustained output growth. Production 
expansion entails a respective expansion of the capital stock, but with a time lag and 
"overshooting". The latter implies that, while positive GDP growth induces accelerating 
investment spending, net investment will be negative when the economy is in a recession.6 
Thus, poor prospects for the economy cause a steady decline in investment and, consequently, 
a decay in the capital stock overall. Exactly that happened in Russia: while the GDP index 
was about 50 percent, the investment index fell even farther (Diagrams 1 and 2). The channel 
for depressing the output has therefore been, ceteris paribus, the sharp decline in investment 
demand. 
Much has been said about the arbitrary taxation and the high income (corporate) tax rates in 
Russia. A high tax rate reduces the planned profit, but it allows firms to deduct a larger 
portion of the rental costs of capital (interest money paid on investment credit) from the tax 
sum they owe the budget. Businesses take advantage of the so-called tax credit to match their 
net returns7 with the after-tax capital costs: a corporate tax rate of, say, 50 percent halves a 
planned profit of 10 percent. Since the rental cost was initially 10 percent too,8 the firm is 
allowed to lower it by the tax rate of 50 percent and thus to maintain the microeconomic 
equilibrium. Consequently, it seems that the corporate tax rate tends to discourage investment 
decisions to a lesser extent; what is a cause of much more complaint in Russia is the arbitrary 
taxation and the uncertain tax legislation which businesses face. 
                                                 
5 Anders Åslund: Why Has Russia's Economic Transformation Been So Arduous? op. cit., p. 20. 
6 The accelerator model of investment asserts that the rate of investment will be proportional to the rate of 
GDP growth (positive or negative). 
7 Correctly, they equalize the marginal product of capital with its rental cost. 
8 To be in equilibrium from a microeconomic viewpoint, the marginal investment returns (say, 10 percent) 
must equal the investment price (likewise 10 percent). 
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2.2 Government spending 
The transformation to a market-based economy enforced a radical reduction in the size of the 
Russian government as of the early 1990s. While state expenditures constituted about two 
thirds of GDP in 1992, they decreased to roughly one third in the mid-1990s and remain at 
this level today (Diagram 3). Such a massive cut in government spending was prompted by 
shrinking tax revenues, which in turn were the result of output depression and also of wide-
spread tax evasion. A reduced-size government affects aggregate demand and causes output 
to fall. In a recovery phase, an increase in government spending stimulates a higher output 
growth than would be the case in an economy without government. In a recession phase, any 
reduction in government spending entails higher GDP losses, and budgetary policies targeting 
a balanced budget should be avoided unless strong growth is being attained. 
Diagram 3: Index of real GDP and General Government expenditures 
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP
Expenditures
 
Source: Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., various issues, Table 1, 
11; Institute of macroeconomic forecasting: Ekonomika Rossii …, op. cit. p. 11-15. 
Unfortunately, exactly this happened in Russia between 1992 and 1998, and there is strong 
evidence that the output slump was caused to a large degree by the budget adjustment. The 
decrease in government spending unleashes a greater GDP decrease because of the 
multiplier.9 This is the amount by which production changes when (autonomous) demand 
                                                 
9 To calculate the multiplier, suppose the aggregate demand AD is equal to the output (income) Y, i.e.: AD 
= C + I + G = Y; C = C + cYd; Y = C + cYd + I + G = A + c(Y - T), where C, I, G, and A denote autono-
mous consumption, investment, government spending and autonomous demand, respectively, Yd is the 
disposable (after-tax) income, T the tax revenues and c the marginal propensity to consume out of the 
disposable income. A = C + I + G. Since T are a portion of Y, T = tY, where t is the tax rate. Inserting into 
the equation of the income and removing the brackets yields: Y = A + cY - ctY = A + cY(1 - t). Hence 
Y - cY(1 - t) = A; Y(1 - c(1 - t))  = A; Y = (1/1 - c(1 + t))A = aA; Then DY = aDA, where a denotes the 
multiplier. If only government spending changes, DY = aDG. 
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changes by one unit, and since the multiplier is larger than unity it affects the economy even 
in the case of  small demand changes. In Russia a vicious circle of government spending cuts 
and contraction of the tax base provoked a rapid output decline in the early 1990s. During the 
initial recession, the reduction in the size of government was accompanied by a substantial 
reduction in effective income taxation, which in a pure mathematical sense means a larger 
multiplier and more pronounced output decrease. Fortunately, lower taxation partly makes up 
for the malign impact of the spending cuts, since it encourages consumption spending. The 
need to reduce government spending in 1992/93 to a sustainable size appears, however, to 
have been unavoidable and thus a temporary recession (depression) seems to have been 
inevitable. Later – after 1993 – the Treasury failed to stabilize revenues, which obviously 
accelerated GDP decline and tax evasion, continuing the vicious circle. Moreover, the 
authorities lost their ability to revitalize the economy by increasing government spending. 
One ruble in additional demand created by the government would have caused output growth 
well in excess of one ruble, since in Russia's economy with low taxation the multiplier is 
large. Unfortunately, when spending cuts outpace the decline in GDP, the stabilizer's influence 
becomes negative, helping to turn the recession into a depression. 
Demand-side policies concerning government spending are linked, firstly, to government pur-
chases of goods and services, and secondly, to government transfers, including transfers of in-
terest rate gains on government bonds. An increase in government purchases raises aggregate 
demand, and firms try to respond by increasing output. Because of the high relative weight of 
government purchases on overall spending, the effect of each additional ruble spent by the 
government is strong. 
The share of government purchases in nominal GDP declined in Russia along with the size 
reduction in government during the 1990s, whereas the share of the transfers increased 
(Table 1). 
Table 1: General Government purchases and transfers, ruble bn 
Year GDP purchases purchases/GDP
(per cent) 
transfers transfers/GDP
(per cent) 
1992 19.2 9.2 47.9 1.9 9.9 
1993 171.5 56.0 32.7 18.7 10.9 
1994 611 204.4 33.5 70.8 11.6 
1995 1540.5 415.2 27.0 195.1 12.7 
1996 2145.7 567.9 26.5 330.6 15.4 
1997 2586.4 718.3 27.8 398.4 15.4 
1998 2684 664.9 24.8 400.6 14.9 
Source: Russian Federation: Recent Economic Development, in: IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/100, 
Washington, D.C., September 1999, Tables 19, 20, 21. 
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In real terms (in 1992 rubles), government purchases contracted by 35, 12, and 51 per cent in 
1993, 1995, and 1998 respectively. In 1994, 1996 and 1997 they increased by 16, 12, and 14 
per cent, respectively.10 These increases were, however, too weak to offset the decline during 
the rest of the decade, so the total shrink was 56.4 per cent. It is clear that such a deep cut in 
government purchases, which in turn constitute the largest portion of overall government 
spending (Table 1), has had a massive negative impact on output. As already suggested, the 
link between GDP contraction and the changes in government purchases is the multiplier. 
This depends on the (marginal) propensity to consume out of disposable income on the one 
hand, and the income tax rate on the other (footnote 9). Because of the severe economic crisis 
and the general decline in the income of the population, one can assume a fairly high 
(marginal) propensity to consume out of disposable income, which is the mirror picture of a 
declining saving rate. Simultaneously, personal income tax rates can be estimated to be low – 
either because individual income is low or for "technical" reasons such as corruption and tax 
evasion. It is well known that in the 1990s the Treasury's revenues relied mainly on sales 
taxes (value added and turnover taxes, and excises), whereas the authorities were unable to 
collect properly the planned direct, i.e. income, taxes. For instance, a marginal propensity to 
consume of approximately 80 per cent and an average income tax rate of roughly 18 per cent 
yield in mathematical terms a multiplier of 2.9. Depending on the actual taxation, the 
multiplier may be estimated to be at least between 2 and 3.11 Put another way, one ruble less 
in government purchases causes, ceteris paribus, a decline of up to three rubles in nominal 
output. 
While the reduction in aggregate demand induced by the decrease in government spending on 
goods and services has a strong malign impact on the equilibrium output, the increase in gov-
ernment transfers referred to earlier may have mitigated the overall strain on GDP. Higher 
transfer payments reflect a hitherto unknown phenomenon in Russian reality, linked to the 
new social commitment of the government, which is called upon to finance the health and 
pension systems and to provide benefits to individuals with low income. The transfer amount 
in Russia consists of the expenditures of the social security system, the social security 
payments made by the regional and local authorities, and the interest on the government debt. 
As a portion of GDP, it has increased since 1992 (Table 1). Transfers caused aggregate 
demand to respond less strongly to the cuts in government purchases of goods and services. 
The explanation is that transfer payments lower the sum spent by government itself and thus 
the multiplier.12 Benefits help to keep demand higher despite unemployment and stabilize the 
output. If there were no transfers, aggregate demand in Russia would be even lower, and the 
cuts in government spending would have aggravated the crisis further. Therefore, the transfer 
                                                 
10 Computed on the basis of Table 1 taking into account the respective inflation rates, here the CPI. 
11 In the real word it might, however, be lower because, according to the IS-LM model, it actually depends also 
on the interest rates, which are low in times of crisis. Low rates encourage the economy and offset the slump 
to a given degree. 
12 An increase in transfers by one ruble lowers the government multiplier by that increase times the marginal 
propensity to consume, i.e. the multiplier changes to ca, where c and a are the marginal propensity to con-
sume and the government multiplier, respectively. 
16 Berichte des BIOst 2000 
payments made by the authorities have partly outweighed the decline in expenditure. In real 
terms (1992 rubles), total transfer payments increased by almost 45 per cent between 1992 
and 1998. 
A substantial part of the total transfer payments is accounted for, however, by interest paid on 
the growing government domestic and external debt. Bearing in mind that, in the late 1990s, 
almost 50 per cent of interest payments went to foreigners, the overall impact of government 
transfers on the economy should be considered less important. Consequently, the combined 
effect – less purchases and more transfers taken together – of the change in the size of 
government was a severe output decline. Other things being equal, the combined effect of 
decreased purchases and increased transfers might have led to an overall fall in the real GDP 
by roughly 39 percent within 8 years.13 
2.3 Consumption spending 
Consumption spending in Russia stabilized at about two thirds of GDP, and thus accounted 
for most of aggregate demand. During the transitional depression it declined less in real terms 
than did the GDP, because individuals tried to maintain a smooth flow of consumption. They 
had planned their purchases with respect to their lifetime disposable or permanent income, 
and so consumption has not depended on current output only. In the short run, however, 
increasing liquidity constraints forced the Russians to reduce their actual consumption, as 
many did not have any savings left to draw down, high inflation having devalued them in the 
early years of transition (Diagram 4). 
Diagram 4: Real household consumption and real output index, 1989 = 100 
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13 Since the output change DY is a function of the weighted cuts in purchases DP and weighted transfer increase 
DT times the marginal propensity to consume c, both of them times the multiplier a, DY = 0.35*(-0.56) 
*2.9+0.8*0.1*0.45*2.9 = -0.387 or -39%. In real terms DP = -0.56, and DT = 0.45, whereas a = 2.9 when c 
is estimated at 0.8. Purchases and transfers are weighted by 0.35Y and 0.1Y, respectively Source: Russian 
Federation: Recent Economic Development, in: IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/100, Washington, D.C., 
September 1999 Tables 19, 20, 21. 
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Sources: Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., various issues, Table 1. 
A glance at the GDP breakdown by use makes it clear that the increase in the consump-
tion/output ratio was possible only at the expense of the decrease in the investment/output 
ratio and the size of government, whereas net exports have expanded relative to GDP. But for 
output to increase, consumption must first rise, which would – because their levels are linked 
to income – help expand investment and government spending too, and so forth. 
As the consumption curve in Diagram 4 indicates, consumption decline fluctuated in the 
1990s. This might be a result of temporary increases in the disposable household income, say, 
through occasional wage rises. Or it may reflect the purchase of consumer durables such as TV 
sets, refrigerators, cars etc., which are bought only periodically, thus causing fluctuations in 
consumption demand, or it may be due to a combination of both of the above. These fluctua-
tions may also reveal a sustained uncertainty about the future outcome of the economy and, 
consequently, of the household income. Most consumption theories suggest that current 
consumption reflects a memorized past income level, i.e. the longer the low-income phase, 
the more enduring the low propensity to consume out of current disposable income. 
Consumption may lag behind a possible rise in income, as the individual may fear that the 
improved income level is only temporary. The pattern of the consumption curve in Russia 
since the mid-1990s appears to prove this empirically: in 1997 the real consumption of good 
and services rose compared to the previous year. Obviously, individuals have gained 
confidence, as in 1997 the stabilization appeared convincing and inflation was reduced 
remarkably to roughly 11 percent from about 130 percent in 1995. Such fluctuations in 
consumption demand occurred again in 1998 and 1999. Until the ruble crash in August 1998, 
capital imports and lower inflation encouraged consumer demand, whereas in 1999 an output 
recovery helped consumption to rise from its record low after the August crisis the year 
before. From the demand-side viewpoint of economic policy, this implies that Russian 
consumers have had very unstable incomes over the last ten years and might respond more 
neutrally even to positive overall perspectives of the economy. Only if they are convinced that 
the recovery is sustained and that their income has improved permanently, will they raise 
consumption to a higher long-term level and therefore boost output growth. 
Russia's infamous oligarchs took advantage of the redistribution of the national wealth which 
took place in the wake of privatization. By using insider information and misusing political 
links and personal connections, they managed to take over the most valuable industrial assets 
left over from the former USSR and became the "new Russian rich". Because consumption is 
linked not only to past and current labor income but also to the wealth available, an increase 
in wealth affects output. In the short run, when there is an increase in wealth, the portion of 
consumption from disposable income rises. So, have the few very rich contributed to a positive 
GDP performance or at least to a delayed output decline? Such wealth effects (actually effects 
of wealth redistribution) on consumption demand are, however, minimal, except for very 
large changes in, say, stock prices. This really did happen in Russia in 1997, but the stock 
exchange boom was followed by a severe crash and no net effect on the output can be 
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discerned. Moreover, in the long run the wealthy tend to consume less out of their disposable 
income, which diminishes any possible positive "spending spree" effect on GDP. 
To sum up, the conclusion might be that the crisis diminished consumption demand, which is 
unable to recover, and thus output stays low, too. The redistribution of the national income 
has had no positive effect on overall consumption spending, i.e. the new rich's legendary 
"lavish spending" has not driven up the economy. Since the history of wide income 
fluctuations and uncertainty in Russia has been relatively long (roughly 10 years) it will – 
unless there is a fabulous GDP performance – take some time to restore the consumers' 
confidence and to accelerate output growth. The hesitant adjustment of consumption to any 
rise in incomes will cause output to adjust slowly to spending, too; and strong growth will 
take place only after the rise in incomes has been recognized as permanent. 
A first conclusion to be derived for the policy response to the decline in consumer spending 
would be to try to raise the disposable wage income of the households. Governments can not 
raise wages (except in the civil service), but they can reduce taxation. In Russia this matter is 
complicated due to the fact that income tax is the main source of revenue for the regional 
budgets, whereas corporate tax is centralized within the Federal Government's budget. But 
while these are more technical difficulties, the main problem arises from the overall low labor 
income, resulting in only low household tax rates, as many workers do not receive their 
wages regularly. In better-off sectors such as services and foreign trade, tax evasion is 
commonplace, so that these sectors benefit from an "as if" tax reduction. 
Much has been said about the poor record of the financial authorities, which have proved una-
ble to collect the planned tax revenue, thus prompting a lasting fiscal crisis. But as outlined 
above, when taxes are reduced the multiplier rises and one ruble in additional demand affects 
output more strongly. Lower taxation – whether coming involuntarily or introduced by a gov-
ernment decision – serves to increase disposable incomes and thus to keep aggregate demand 
higher. Then, in a depression, the decline in output will be less severe than it would have been 
without tax cuts. In Russia, income taxes due decreased by one third between 1993 and 1999. 
Because of widespread wage arrears, income taxes collected contracted even more in real 
terms during the 1990s, by approximately 50 per cent. Since real wages halved, too, between 
1993 and 1998 (Table 2), a net effect of a lower tax rate on the equilibrium output cannot be 
identified. The real wage cut occurred partly because enterprises do not pay wages regularly 
and partly due to the high inflation at the beginning and the end of the decade, which reduced 
real incomes such that many income receivers dropped out of the minimum tax brackets. 
Table 2: Real wages and income tax due indices 
Year wage  income tax  
1993 100.0 100.0 
1994 91.3 89.8 
1995 67.1 64.5 
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1996 75.8 63.7 
1997 79.2 74.3 
1998 66.5 66.3 
1999 51.5 69.8 
Sources: Russian Federation: Recent Economic Development, in: IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/100, 
Washington, D.C., September 1999 Table 21; Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., various issues, 
Tables  5. 
2.4 Export demand 
Unlike the other components of aggregate demand, Russia succeeded in maintaining net ex-
ports (the excess of exports over imports) over the depression period and continued to do so 
in 1999, when growth resumed. Increasing exports contribute to output growth and hence 
help the economy to overcome the crisis faster or to relieve the harshness of the depression. 
While domestic demand was sluggish, demand for Russian goods abroad kept exports on track. 
Therefore the export sector, especially oil and gas, kept the whole economy alive. The 
paramount importance of this sector for the Russian economy results from the export 
multiplier, which links exports with output and hence makes GDP changes dependent on 
changes in exports.14 In Russia, exports constituted about 20 per cent of GDP in the 1990s. 
After the devaluation of the ruble, however, they surmounted a 40 per cent share in GDP in 
dollar terms in 1999 and are expected to stay high.15 In this same year a strong GDP growth 
was reported, but it can hardly be attributed to changes in reported exports, because these were 
insignificant, rising from $74 to 74.5 billion in 1998 and 1999, respectively. Rather, export 
growth helped to keep GDP decline lower in the early 1990s, as exports expanded from $50 
billion to $89 billion between 1992 and 1997. In the crisis year 1998, exports decreased 
sharply, which may have exacerbated the situation. 
In the long run, however, the exports/GDP ratio may fall, since successive reforms may create 
a positive environment for investment and growth. Most countries show smaller exports/GDP 
ratios than Russia does at this moment, and if Russia adjusts, too, the relative importance of 
export demand within aggregate demand will decline. If one takes into account trade not only 
with goods but also with services, the picture changes toward a current account that is smaller 
than the trade balance. This is mainly because of the negative factor/income balance, i.e. 
Russia's net interest payments on foreign capital received. It is also caused by Russia's net 
service imports, especially travel abroad. While the current account/GDP ratio has always 
been positive but was relatively small before 1998, it increased sharply after the ruble 
                                                 
14 According to the export base concept, Y = mX, where Y denotes the output and X the exports. The multi-
plier m is Y/X and hence > 1. Thus, a bigger change in exports causes a bigger output change. Source: 
Michael Bradfield: Regional Economics. McGraw-Hill, Toronto and Montreal, 1988, p. 38. 
15 Sources: Roland Goetz: Russische Wirtschaft vor dem Aufschwung? Federal Institute for European and 
Russian Studies, Current Analysis No. 24, Cologne, 2000, p. 2; Russian Federation: Recent Economic De-
velopment, in: IMF Staff Country Report, op. cit., Table 26. 
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devaluation and reached 12.3 per cent in 1999, with a tendency to fall slowly in 2000 and 
after. From the viewpoint of a crisis-shaken economy, such high current account-to-GDP 
ratios indicate foregone opportunities to invest, since a portion of the domestic saving stays 
idle or is being lent to foreigners. To normalize the ratio between current account and output, 
income or imports – especially of capital goods – must rise. Given the clearly undervalued 
ruble right now, imports cannot catch up quickly, but foreign direct investment can, because 
at the current exchange rate Russian assets such as stocks are inexpensive in dollar terms. A 
privatization policy dedicated to opening the doors for investors might help to accelerate 
growth and thus to reduce net exports in favor of a higher domestic investment rate. 
Expanding domestic demand would increase imports, but once confidence in the reliability of 
the Russian reform policies is regained, possible negative current accounts can be financed by 
capital imports and thus by obtaining foreign savings to increase the investment rate further. 
A sustained growth needed to raise the standard of the economy and to support democracy can 
be achieved. 
3. Demand-side policies 
3.1 Monetary policy and aggregate demand 
The monetary policy of the Central bank affects aggregate demand especially by encouraging 
investment, but also by influencing consumption spending. Furthermore, export demand can 
be controlled via the exchange rate setting. Demand-side policies therefore work on a wide 
basis and are important for restoring equilibrium in the case of recession or – as in Russia – of 
depression. A more aggressive money supply causes unanticipated price growth and 
contributes to a better trade-off between inflation and employment.16 The more workers find 
employment, the larger the consumption effect, since a positive consumer sentiment causes 
people to purchase more goods. Commercial banks obtain easier refinance credit which they 
pass on to firms. These are encouraged by the lower interest rate to launch investment projects 
and, consequently, to put more employees on their payroll. Confident employees want more 
goods and services and boost consumption spending, and so forth. 
In most cases, these policies may be successful in depressed economies, but sometimes 
business and individuals do not respond to such market-based interference, that is to say, 
households, firms and banks remain unaffected. Even advanced nations can become caught 
up in a liquidity trap – in recent times Japan is such an example, with a stubborn recession in 
spite of a real refinance rate of practically zero. Russia – an emerging market – was by now 
an example of failing demand-side policies too: especially in the early 1990s, the monetary 
policy of the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) was extremely loose. As remarked earlier, it 
provided money not only to the Federal Government but also to republics of the former Soviet 
Union (now the Commonwealth of Independent States) and even to the old Soviet-style 
industrial plants. The result was a high inflation rate – 2,500, 840 and 215 percent in 1992, 
                                                 
16 The Phillip's curve states that when real wages decline firms are willing to hire more workers. 
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1993 and 1994 respectively, which discouraged both producers and consumers and failed to 
prevent the output decline. 
The Central Bank was forced to do so especially for institutional reasons, namely, because of 
the lack of a smoothly working banking system. After 70 years without decentralized 
banking, a two-tier banking system was set up only in the late 1980s, and it soon 
mushroomed. The reorganization of the Soviet banking system led to the emergence of up to 
3,000 new commercial banks. These were and remain, however, in general very weak, since 
even the largest private banks still have little equity capital and modest assets of only a few 
billion dollars. In terms of their assets, these banks are therefore 100 times and more smaller 
than comparable Western institutes. Initially, they were preoccupied with exchange rate 
transactions, as they purchased and sold dollars and other foreign exchange during a period of 
a precipitous fall of the Russian ruble. As of 1995, monetary policy became more tight, and 
each bank adapted in a different way, according to its market position and management 
interests. The state-owned Savings Bank, which attracts the overwhelming portion of 
household savings, responded by shifting its activities towards lending to the government in 
order to benefit from the high returns promised by government bonds. Although the Central 
Bank of Russia started to cut interest rates, while simultaneously fighting inflation more 
resolutely, it failed to encourage investment and consumption. The CBR's efforts were 
undermined by the government's fiscal policy on the one hand and by the government-owned 
Savings Bank on the other. As a result, household savings were channeled to the bond market, 
crowding out investment in spite of the attempts by monetary policy to create more stability 
and confidence for investment in industrial projects. 
The myriad commercial banks notably stayed away from the bond market – in 1998 only 
about 14 percent of their credit portfolio was claims on the government – but they are mainly 
owned either by the same tycoons who own the private companies or by regional authorities, 
who arbitrarily dictate their credit policies. These banks do not contribute to converting 
national savings into investment. Whereas household savings constitute a minor portion of 
private savings in Russia, roughly about 4.5 percent of GDP, companies save approximately 
tree times more, that is about 12-13 percent of GDP.17 In the 1990s, however, the banking 
system's claims on general government and the private sector surpassed the ruble and foreign 
exchange deposits by many percentage points of GDP. This claims overhang represents 
nonperforming loans, burdening the banking system (Table 3). The resulting credit crunch 
compelled the firms to finance their investment without drawing loans from the banks. The 
commercial banks failed to be a intermediary between saving and investment, and the Central 
Bank's attempts to expand credit is being torpedoed. One explanation for the discrepancy 
between the amounts of deposits and claims is the high interest rates, which expanded the 
debt of the firms, whereas shrinking sales and declining output impeded them from parking 
more savings in the banking system. Another explanation is the contradictory taxation system, 
forcing firms to hold cash and to convert every ruble they did not need for investment into 
                                                 
17 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, Monthly update, Southampton, various 
issues. 
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dollars to hedge against cash holding losses. The overall conclusion is that the business sector 
was preoccupied with fighting to survive instead of attempting to expand and modernize, so 
that the monetary policy of the Central Bank failed to encourage consumption demand. 
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Table 3: Credit and deposit performance of the banking system in the 1990s, ruble bn. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
GDP 1,540 1,245 2,521 2,696 
Claims on General Government 62.6 150.7 191.5 259 
Claims on the private sector 133.8 157.3 226 346 
Total claims 196.4 308 417.5 605 
Foreign exchange deposits  55.3 69.4 80.5 191 
Household ruble deposits  70.6 118.4 148.2 150 
Total deposits (savings) 125.9 187.8 228.7 341 
Nonperforming loans 70.5 120.2 188.8 264 
Nonperforming loans-to-GDP ratio 4.58 9.65 7.49 9.79 
Source: Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., Tables 1, 14. 
3.2 Implications of the flawed banking system 
Compared with other countries in transition, the money/GDP ratio in Russia is very low. This 
ratio indicates the degree of monetization of the economy and the ability of the banking 
system to expand the monetary base via the domestic credit supply. Since no single bank can 
lend more money than the bank's deposit amount, only the interaction between borrowers and 
all banks as a system can increase the availability of money. Thus, an ailing bank which 
cannot extend credit hurts other banks and firms, and so it halts the output recovery. 
Conversely, while the Central Bank mainly controls the monetary base, a healthy banking 
system enables the money/GDP ratio to widen. In the extreme case of a banking "system" 
consisting only of a central bank, the monetary base, roughly the currency in circulation, will be 
equal to the money stock, roughly the monetary base plus checking and various saving 
deposits. As deposits cannot be made and credits cannot be extended either, the currency 
available cannot be converted into quasi money. The money multiplier, which is the money 
stock-to-monetary base ratio, will be unity. 
If there is a banking system, but customers prefer to hold less money in bank accounts and 
more money in cash in their mattresses, the multiplier will remain low and the money stock 
too. Conversely, the less the public tends to hold cash, the bigger the multiplier and the money 
stock. The public's propensity to park money in banks depends on the interest rate given on 
deposits, as higher real interest rates would increase the opportunity costs of currency 
holding. The deposit rate is influenced by the market interest rate, which is sensitive to the 
refinancing (discount) rate set by the Central bank to control credit expansion and therefore 
the money stock. 
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Table 4: Monetary aggregates in Russia and the West 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
GDP, rub. billion  1540 1245 2521 2696 4467 
monetary base (M0), rub. billion 103.8 130.9 164.5 210.4 324.3 
money stock (M2), rub. billion 220.8 288.3 374.1 448.3 704 
M0/GDP 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.07 
M2/GDP 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.16 
money multiplier 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.2 
Memo: OECD data 
M0/GDP  0.07 
M2/GDP  0.76 
money multiplier  9.8 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, op. cit. Tables 1, 13; IMF, World Economic Outlook, various issues, statis-
tical appendices. 
While the monetary base-to-GDP ratio (MO/GDP) is almost the same in Russia and the West, 
the money multiplier clearly differs (Table 4). In Russia there is a banking system with com-
mercial banks unwilling to extend credit and individuals reluctant to entrust their money to 
banks. The reason is rather low, even negative, real deposit interest rates that discourage the 
demand for assets other than currency. A convincing correlation between deposit rates and 
monetization (the broad money M2-to-GDP ratio) can be identified (Diagram 5). The demand 
for deposits was elastic in 1996 and 1997, the real interest rates banks paid on deposits were 
positive. In the second half of 1998 and in 1999, deposit rates became negative in real terms 
and the elasticity diminished. If the elasticity of demand for deposits with respect to the 
interest rate is less than unity, this indicates that the public considers deposits to be "inferior 
goods" of fading importance. 
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Table 5: Deposit rates and deposit demand by the public 
 real deposit rate, per cent bank deposits growth rate, per cent elasticity* 
1995 -29   
1996 33 156.83 4.75 
1997 5.8 45.16 7.79 
1998 -67 -24.93 0.37 
1999 -22.3 96.97 -4.35 
* deposit demand elasticity with respect to interest rate. Source: Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., Tables 14, 
15. 
This is why monetization was at its peak in Russia in 1996, though far below the level in the 
advanced world (23 and 76 per cent of GDP, respectively). With real deposit rates decreasing, 
monetization also decreased to levels of about 16 per cent of the nominal GDP (Diagram 4), 
indicating a smaller money multiplier and less domestic credit. But why do the commercial 
banks offer low deposit rates and why do they not compete for the deposits of the public? 
Commercial banks, like any other firm, work on a cost-benefit base, i.e. they try to lower their 
operating costs to enlarge the profit they earn. Consequently, a low, or negative, real interest 
rate on deposits fits well, as banks have to calculate the refinance cost resulting from the 
interest rate policy of the Central bank. The real discount rates of the CBR were very high in 
the mid-1990s and became temporarily negative only in the second half of 1998, before 
recovering again in 1999. As refinancing by CBR credits created high-cost liabilities of the 
banking system, it responded by trying to pass these costs on to its customers by charging 
high real interest rates on loans. Therefore credit became expensive for borrowers until 1998, 
and this provoked business to call for a loose central bank policy. Business people – whether 
red directors or small private entrepreneurs – have been permanently complaining about a 
"tight" money supply since the early 1990s, which they consider is causing a prolonged credit 
shortage. But since only the banking system creates quasi money, it does not make sense in a 
highly uncertain environment to urge the Central bank to print more money. This would just 
fuel inflation with little, if any, real effect on the economy. 
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Diagram 5: Monetization response to deposit rates 
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Source: Russian Economic Trends, various issues. 
Thus, a well known tool for fighting recessions – pumping more cash into the real sector – 
turns out to be inefficient, because there is a defect in the link between the real and the mone-
tary sector. While firms were suffering a liquidity crunch, banks were less and less prepared 
to give firms credit because of their fear of not being allowed to enforce their claims if a 
borrower repudiates on servicing his debt. Banks realized that, for political reasons or when 
elections are approaching, a company which is actually in default must be provided with even 
more credit to avoid bankruptcy and lay-offs. Although the courts in Russia are independent 
and a bankruptcy law has been in force since 1998, lenders usually lose lawsuits. This makes 
banks reluctant to compete for extending credit to the real economy. Money surrogates, credit 
crunch, and various arrears spread over the sectors. Easy money as a means of cure cannot 
contribute to more, but it can cause even less, stabilization. A vicious circle may look like 
this: 
Banks extend credit – firms repudiate debt service – bank failures – low interest rates on 
deposits – currency/deposit ratio increases – money stock falls – credit crunch – depression – 
CBR expands money supply – firms repudiate again – credit crunch – CBR refinances firms18 
– inflation – CBR raises interest rates – credit crunch – depression goes on. 
The next question is: why do firms default on servicing their liabilities? A company takes out 
a loan after careful analysis of its ability to repay it. Otherwise, it usually faces legal action by 
the lender, who may take over the collateral (assets) of that company or impose sanctions. In 
Russia, many firms produce with negative returns but make no effort to match costs and 
revenues. Either the management succeeds in persuading a bank to extend money by bribery 
and personal connections, or it simply relies on a permanent bail-out for political reasons. 
Since firms are not worried much about being closed or sold, they are less prepared to adapt 
to the market conditions and competition. They see credit as an easy way to buy supplies or 
                                                 
18 The CBR ceased to extend credits to firms in 1994. In fall 1998 the CBR refinanced the commercial banks at 
low rates to prevent a bigger bank crisis. 
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pay wages and hardly bother about debt servicing. This cements the vicious circle referred to, 
in which a credit crunch caused by a paralyzed banking system plays a central role. The strong 
position of the borrower torpedoes the monetary policy of the CBR, causes a bank crisis and 
an overall payment standstill. More money cannot eliminate the liquidity trap as long as the 
leak – the bail-out mentality of business – is politically tolerated. Therefore, strengthening the 
Rule of Law is an important priority. It requires developing efficient institutions and effective 
legislative, executive and judicial systems. Legal reforms and the resulting enforcement of the 
Rule of Law are a prerequisite not only for establishing a climate conducive to investment, 
essential to achieving sustainable and equitable growth, but also for consolidating democracy 
and for building up the conviction that democracy and market economy are indivisible.19 
4. Recent trends in the demand components 
After the collapse of the pegged exchange rate in August 1998, output declined once again, 
but soon a recovery started, which finally culminated in 3.2 per cent GDP growth in 1999. 
This success was somewhat unexpected, since many analysts believed that the government 
would not be able to manage the crisis without another severe depression. Now, different 
approaches to explaining the result identify either favorable conditions or cyclical factors as 
contributing to growth. Usually, the former are linked to windfall gains from rising raw 
material prices and the increased competitiveness of import-competing sectors following the 
devaluation of the ruble. While the favorable conditions might be understood as transitory, 
the cyclical effects could be of lasting importance. In particular, the relatively successful 
stabilization of the economy in the fall of 1998 and in 1999 is considered a precondition for 
growing consumer confidence and better investor sentiment, paving the way for more 
spending and thus for growth. A closer look at the components of aggregate demand, 
however, casts doubt on whether the improved shape of the economy is really a durable one. 
As suggested earlier, when a recovery is under way, changes in investment spending and 
consumption reflect the confidence of business and households, who anticipate the 
turnaround. Trusting in expansion of demand, firms start to think about net investment to 
adjust the actual level of their capital stock to the desired level necessary to meet the 
additional demand. Individuals enlarge their spending because they feel confident that the 
income increase they are experiencing right now will continue in the future, too. Since increased 
investment spending triggers output activities across the whole manufacturing sector and 
beyond, whereas consumption spending constitutes the overwhelming part of GDP use, there 
is a stable link between this increase and output growth. Surprisingly, output reportedly grew 
in Russia, yet consumption and investment spending appear to have been sluggish since the 
August 1998 crisis (Diagram 6). 
                                                 
19 The EU's relations with Russia – an overview, in: FT, 05/30/2000, www.ft.com 
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Diagram 6: Real consumption demand and fixed investment indices 
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Consumption seasonally adjusted. Source: Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, 
various issues, Table 1. 
Specifically, consumption by the private households shrank in the aftermath of the crisis due 
to the inflation unleashed in the fall of 1998, and it rebounded only slightly in 1999. On 
balance, however, consumption has not yet returned to its 1997 level. The household sector 
consumption data fit the permanent income hypothesis, according to which individuals are 
initially reluctant to expand their consumption in spite of the obvious increase in their 
income. The official income index has been above the consumption index in real terms, 
although real income contracted temporarily in the fall of 1998. The consumption index also 
closely follows the real wage index,20 which is well below the much broader income index. 
This indicates an uneven income distribution on the one hand and that consumers spend most 
of what they earn, since incomes remain low, on the other. 
Investment spending typically reflects the reaction of business to the slump. In the last quarter 
of 1998, investment demand, for technical reasons, declined less than consumption – invest-
ment projects already launched could not be terminated immediately, but only with some time 
lag after the collapse of the ruble. Soon a recovery started, and pending decisions about 
whether or not to freeze current investment activities were made in favor of continuing them. 
The decline in investment was therefore unimportant. What is more striking, however, is the 
low rate at which investment spending rose in 1999. One explanation might be the reduction 
of inventories and thus low or negative inventory investment. Because firms can produce for a 
while out of stockpiles and reserves, they do not need to invest in more fixed capital 
immediately. Later, when running out of inventories and spares, they start to modernize and 
increase their equipment to meet higher demand by boosting output. Until now, firms in 
Russia have obviously been able to produce out of the current capital stock and have not – on 
balance – completed important investment projects. Another explanation might be the rental 
                                                 
20 No data exist about the wages effectively paid; so the wages due were used to compute the index. Source: 
Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., Tables 5, 6. 
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cost of capital, which is linked to the interest rate level. Because a firm's opportunity to 
expand its capital stock depends not only on the level of output but also on the cost (price) of 
one more unit of capital, interest rates strongly affect this decision. Intuitively, when rates are 
high, firms refrain from borrowing to invest and vise versa. 
Table 6: Monthly rates, per cent 
month inflation rate nominal lending ratea real lending rate 
August 1998 4.9 1.38 -3.62 
September 1998 38.4 1.37 -37.02 
October 1998 6.3 1.38 -4.91 
November 1998 8.2 1.37 -6.86 
December 1998 17.6 1.36 -16.31 
January 1999 to March 2000 4.8 (average) 1.35 (average) -3.43 (average) 
a Compound interest rate per year discounted. Source: Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., Tables 8, 15. 
Astonishingly, lending rates in Russia never adjusted to the inflation rate and have always 
been pretty low, yielding a negative real lending rate (Table 6). After the price hikes in the 
fall of 1998, the monthly real lending rate at which banks extended credits was considerably 
negative, while the rates improved somewhat in 1999 and spring 2000. They still remained 
below zero, but it is a mystery why business did not rush to take advantage of these favorable 
conditions. It is conceivable that firms have been reluctant to invest because of disincentives 
such as high corporate taxation or lack of opportunities to deduct their outlays from their tax bill. 
But, as pointed out earlier, the corporate tax effect on the return on investment is neutral, 
whereas the Treasury accepts a tax credit to encourage investment. Therefore, it is hard to 
assess the outlook for investment spending in the short run. Since there are a lot of lingering 
obstacles on the micro level, it may remain sluggish with a negative output prospect. This 
would mean the asset stripping bias of business referred to earlier is going to prevail in the 
future too. It is also possible that willingness to invest may rebound in the near future, since 
there are no insurmountable macroeconomic impediments discernible, while business 
sentiment appears to be improving. This would revitalize the economy and while stabilizing 
aggregate demand also trigger sustained growth. 
While consumption and investment can not yet strengthen the hypothesis that Russia is about 
to emerge from its long-lasting transitional depression, the recent behavior of government de-
mand and exports support it. The improved budget data, especially, feed the conviction that 
the state is regaining a stronger position and is becoming able to control transformation more 
actively. The Treasury claims that tax collection is increasing and budget deficits diminishing 
in 1999. Government expenditures seem to have expanded at the same time (Diagram 7). At 
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least the data21 available on Federal Government purchases and transfers support the hope that 
greater government demand is affecting aggregate demand and hence promoting GDP 
growth. 
Diagram 7: Federal Government expenditures and effective export indices 
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Real terms. Effective exports include estimated unregistered trade. Source: Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., 
various issues, Tables 9, 11. 
A glance at federal expenditures provides evidence that a link might exist between the recent 
growth and the improved performance of the budget. Just after the collapse of the crawling 
band22 real expenditures shrank sharply, but recovered in the following months after inflation 
subsided. In 1999 Federal Government spending fluctuated around a clearly positive trend 
and increased on balance. As already suggested, assuming a high marginal propensity to 
consume out of disposable income and fairly low taxation, a large multiplier can be taken into 
account. The result is that even small spending increases have been sufficient to encourage 
some growth. Moreover, the good news from the federal budget makes it reasonable to 
assume that regional and local authorities have raised their spending, too. With government 
demand accounting for an increasing share in aggregate demand, the final effect may have 
been considerable. 
Much has been said about the devaluation effect on output since the fall of 1998. Devaluation 
makes domestic items cheaper in terms of a foreign currency (which in turn appreciates) and 
promotes more exports, improved trade balance, increased competitiveness of the domestic 
sectors producing tradable goods, and thus GDP growth. Official data suggest, however, that 
exports have hardly risen; and that the trade balance is now better off only due to lower 
imports. A sharp depreciation followed by a decrease in imports may encourage domestic 
supply, since firms respond to the shift in demand from imported to domestic-manufactured 
goods – if it happens. But as analyzed earlier, domestic private demand was sluggish after the 
                                                 
21 No monthly data are available on the regional budgets and extra-budgetary funds. Consequently, state de-
mand is estimated on the basis of Federal government data, assuming a proportionate increase in spending at 
all levels. 
22 Until August 17, 1998 the ruble was pegged to the US dollar but allowed to depreciate by an announced rate. 
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devaluation and hardly contributed to the recovery at all. Instead, demand for imported goods 
in Russia was simply reduced, and no switch of the kind referred to occurred. With domestic 
private demand lower, the only positive effect of the devaluation might have been a better 
trade balance. In other words, the domestic manufacturing sectors have hardly benefited from 
devaluation up to now, or at least the resulting benefit appears insignificant. 
Nonetheless, the economy has drawn some advantage from the new exchange rate policy. A 
closer examination of the behavior of the export sector suggests the conclusion that overall 
exports have increased (Diagram 7) and have thus supported revitalization of the GDP. 
Taking into account not only the officially reported export volume but also the "shadow" 
exports, overall export demand has encouraged more output growth. Otherwise it would be 
hard to explain the respectable 3.2 percent growth in 1999 merely by the increase in just one 
component of aggregate demand, notably government spending. If exports are added, the 
picture rounds up, since these constitute a large portion of the current GDP. Amazingly, a 
strong increase in exports is more clearly seen as of the second half of 1999, whereas in the 
months before they oscillated around the old trend. This can be partly explained by seasonal 
factors (the hard Russian winter is a less suitable period for pumping oil or natural gas), so 
exports declined in the last quarter of 1998 and recovered in the following spring. Yet it is a 
riddle why exports failed to flourish in the summer of 1999. On the contrary, they caught up 
somewhat later, when a real appreciation of the ruble actually may have reduced the 
competitiveness of Russian exports.23 As a trend, exports nevertheless rose between fall 1998 
and spring 2000, and have supported the recovery. Especially when a strong multiplier is 
taken into account, the large share of export demand in aggregate demand suggests a strong 
impact on output growth. 
5. Implications of the demand trends for future growth 
So far, the analysis has delivered a mixed picture about whether the nascent recovery might 
be considered a sustained or transitory one. Sustained growth refers to a cyclical 
improvement, whereas the transitory effects might expire in the short term and thus cause 
another economic slump. From the demand-side viewpoint, the most relevant cyclical 
indicators are investment and consumption spending, since these are endogenous and reflect 
the expectations of business and the households. 
The analysis of investment demand failed to shed light on the question of whether firms are 
percieving a better outlook for the economy and hence intend to raise their capital stock on 
hand. A successful macroeconomic stabilization assumed, low interest rates and reliable 
exchange rate policies should, intuitively, encourage investment decisions. Since these have 
obviously been postponed until now, the reason may lie on the micro level, where property 
rights uncertainties and arbitrary local administration strengthen the tendency towards rent 
seeking rather than profit seeking. The rent seeking hypothesis can be refuted, however, if it 
                                                 
23 The Central Bank of Russia sticks to a managed float of the ruble, allowing nominal depreciation that is 
lower than the inflation rate and thus causing a creeping real appreciation. 
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turns out that business has already launched investment projects which may take effect in the 
coming months. This idea appears to be corroborated by data on bank loans, as 1999 and the 
spring of 2000 have seen an increase in banking sector net claims on the private business 
sector in real terms. Fortunately, this increase cannot be attributed mainly to nonperforming 
old loans, since overdue payments have not risen since the fall of 1998. Also, firms have 
hardly been using loans to settle their arrears, for the amount in arrears has been kept more or 
less constant in nominal terms.24 In real terms arrears have halved in the meantime. This 
implies that firms have been settling their arrears by devaluing them rather than by cash 
payment. Unless managers have siphoned borrowed money abroad, they might have used 
bank credit for investment, thus growing investment spending on new equipment might be 
under way. This will be a clear sign that the recovery in output is a lasting one and will 
confirm the current trend of the GDP outcome. 
Private consumption has not recovered and hence could not play any positive role in support-
ing output growth. This is not surprising in the light of the hypothesis that current 
consumption decisions by individuals reflect their past experience. Since income and thus 
consumption have decreased in the past few years, even a good economic outlook leaves the 
Russians cautious, prompting for a while a consumption trend that lags behind the output 
trend. If improving consumer sentiment does not collapse soon, consumer spending is 
expected to expand, which may put growth on a sustained path. 
Under such circumstances, the behavior of the other two demand components, notably 
government spending and export demand, take on crucial importance. Moreover, both are 
strongly integrated, since government expenditures, which rose between fall 1998 and spring 
2000, are at present heavily dependent on the export outcome. The government took advantage 
of the undervalued ruble and rising prices for crude oil and other export items in 1999. For 
instance, tariffs on exports of crude oil account for about 8% of the federal budget revenue and 
are denominated in euros, thus enabling a larger ruble equivalent of the tariff revenues, 
attributed to the higher world market prices in dollar terms. Even if the direct effect of higher 
oil prices on budget revenues may not have been large (since oil companies usually pay taxes 
according to individual agreements negotiated with the Treasury, which do not immediately 
take into account higher oil prices), a positive effect can be discerned from the increased 
profitability of the oil companies' suppliers and a greater proportion of cash settlements from 
which the budget also benefits. 
The increase in federal budget revenues is therefore being driven right now mainly by exoge-
nous factors: the increase in export sector competitiveness thanks to devaluation, and the 
effect of higher export prices.25 If these factors should fade away, expenditures will, ceteribus 
paribus, have to contract because of the strong budget constraint resulting from the huge overall 
(domestic and external) government debt. They can therefore only go hand in hand with 
improved revenues, especially from a larger tax base and better tax collection. A deterioration 
                                                 
24 Data sources: Russian economic trends, op. cit., Tables 7 and 14. 
25 Knut Eggenberger, Has Russia Turned The Corner? in: Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., May 1999, p. 7. 
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of the terms of trade accompanied by a stronger ruble may undermine the prospects for 
growth. 
The money supply outcome also indicates prospects for a recovery in output, since an 
expanding money supply in real terms usually reflects depositors' confidence, and therefore 
more savings are available for passing on to investors and consumers via the banking system. 
Between fall 1998 and spring 2000 the currency/deposit ratio first worsened, but later 
improved. Typically, when depositors get hit by an exchange rate collapse or inflation, they 
withdraw deposits from the banks. This way they raise the currency/deposit ratio, while 
simultaneously reducing the money stock. During the August-October 1998 period, the 
currency/deposit ratio jumped from 63 to 79 per cent, but normalized somewhat in 1999 and 
continued to decline in spring 2000, reaching 50 per cent at this moment. The money multi-
plier, for its part, increased slightly, too.26 These improvements appear, however, insufficient 
to derive any serious conclusions, since for example the monetization of the economy did not 
augment, indeed, it has even decreased meanwhile. The slow and deficient recovery of the 
currency/deposit ratio either reflects an ongoing low savings rate in Russia, where households 
consume almost their whole disposable income. Or it is linked to a continuing skepticism 
about whether the banking system is a reliable place to entrust savings to, considering the 
depositors' poor experience during the 1990s, let alone the fact that deposit rates are negative 
in real terms. While ruble deposits shrank sharply and have not yet caught up with their pre-
crisis level, dollar-denominated deposits have rebounded more or less but still remain below 
their level in summer 1998. But larger dollar-denominated deposits might result from the 
currency control policies imposed by the authorities on export/import transactions in the post-
August 1998 period. Even if this is not so, more foreign exchange savings are evidence of 
uncertainty among households and indicate ongoing skepticism concerning the short-term 
prospects of the economy. This in turn is going to perpetuate the vicious circle of pessimistic 
expectations, low consumption spending and poor output growth. 
Finally, mandatory reserve rates on all deposits were increased in 1999, which per definition 
lowers the money multiplier and thus cuts the money supply. The reason is that the excess re-
serves of the banking system have continued to increase, since banks only reluctantly 
transform reserves into "useful" assets such as loans. Although they would prefer to buy 
securities, the tiny Russian securities market puts tough limits on this. To prevent banks from 
using their reserves to purchase foreign exchange and thus from expanding the currency, the 
Central Bank raised reserve requirements. Higher excess reserves accompanied by higher 
mandatory reserves mean less money available for lending. A currently smaller multiplier 
limits domestic credit expansion and at the same time opportunities to invest or to draw 
consumption credit at this time. 
It is therefore hard to assess whether the recent grow may be considered as a sustained one or 
not. Important components of aggregate demand, which usually drive output revitalization, 
have been sluggish in the aftermath of the August 1998 crisis. Surprisingly, successful stabiliza-
                                                 
26 From a 2.27 bottom to a 3.0 peak in October 1998 and February 2000, respectively. 
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tion took place in late 1998 and, despite sluggish investment spending and consumption, a 
remarkable recovery followed in 1999. The reason is that favorable circumstances have con-
tributed to this recovery. Output has recovered thanks to a temporary improvement in the 
competitiveness of the export sector and the expansion of government purchases and 
transfers. Under such circumstances, the cyclical improvements are of crucial importance. 
Otherwise, the gains from massive currency depreciation and higher raw material prices 
should be considered windfall gains, which tend to abate – either because the exchange rate 
policy pursued by the Central bank is causing a gradual real appreciation or because oil prices 
are going to decline in the future. For instance, about 40 per cent of the Federal budget 
revenue at this time comes from foreign trade operations.27 A gradual ruble appreciation in 
real terms will make Russia's oil and gas exports less competitive. Contracting exports will 
harm the improved budget revenues, hence the larger expenditures will turn out to have been 
only transitory. Furthermore, a stronger ruble will cause export demand to decline and hence 
reduce aggregate demand. As a result, unless the other demand components rebound, GDP 
growth is likely to collapse. 
                                                 
27 Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., p. 8. 
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Sustained growth possible, but with caveats 
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Summary 
Introductory Observations 
The transitional depression in Russia is proving to be worse than the Great Depression in the 
US, because severe demand-side shocks badly affected the components of aggregate demand 
in the 1990s. Yet recent data report a strong recovery, which is a confusing puzzle, since dif-
ferent hypotheses may be put forward to explain it. One of these considers the current output 
growth to be transitory, caused by a convenient constellation of favorable macroeconomic 
conditions. Another explanation pattern rests on the conviction that Russian stabilization 
happens to be durable, being the result of improved fundamentals. Consequently, a growing 
confidence in the ability of the authorities to handle the economy is feeding optimism among 
investors and consumers, and driving up output. Admittedly, the task of proving the one or the 
other hypothesis is not straightforward, since facts may simultaneously support and refute 
either. 
Findings 
1. The contraction of investment demand, which accounts strongly for the business cycle, 
provides an idea of why the depression has been so deep. The transition reform really got 
started in 1992, but the fixed investment rate began to fall and seems to have bottomed 
out only in 1999. Investment demand usually responds to interest rates, and the monetary 
authorities are expected to make investment attractive. Sometimes, however, depending 
on the sensitiveness of investment demand to interest rates, low rates fail to encourage 
investors. In the early 1990s, especially, real interest rates in Russia were clearly below 
zero – just in the phase of the most precipitous decline in investment spending. Under such 
circumstances the opportunities open to monetary policy – as the Russian experience 
proves – are limited. 
2. But fiscal policies failed too: for several years deficit spending was rampant, but investors 
compared the expected discounted returns from alternative investment and avoided 
putting money into factories. Instead, banks, investment funds and private persons rushed 
to take advantage of the high interest rates offered by government bonds. Surprisingly, it 
seems that the widely criticized corporate tax rate tends to discourage investment 
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decisions to a lesser extent; what is a cause of much more complaint in Russia is the 
arbitrary taxation and the uncertain tax legislation. 
3. Because of the output depression and wide spread tax evasion, massive cuts in 
government spending led to a reduced-size government. The result was a shrinking 
aggregate demand and output. For instance, one ruble less in government purchases 
caused, ceteris paribus, a decline of up to three rubles in the nominal output. On the other 
hand, the transfer payments made by the authorities have partly outweighed the decline in 
expenditure. In real terms, transfer payments increased by almost 45 per cent between 
1992 and 1998. Transfers caused aggregate demand to respond less strongly to the cuts in 
government purchases. The combined effect of decreased purchases and increased 
transfers may have led to an overall fall in the real GDP by roughly 39 percent within 8 
years. 
4. Consumption spending declined in real terms less than output. However, because it 
accounts for most of the aggregate demand, when it decreases it causes output to drop, 
too. The redistribution of the national income in favor of the "new rich" has had no 
positive effect on overall consumption spending, i.e. the new rich's legendary "lavish 
spending" has not driven up the economy. Since the history of wide income fluctuations 
and considerable uncertainty in Russia has been long (roughly 10 years) it will – unless 
there is a fabulous output performance – take some time to restore the consumers' 
confidence and to accelerate output growth. The hesitant adjustment of consumption to any 
rise in incomes will cause output to adjust slowly to spending too; and strong growth will 
take place only after the rise in incomes has been recognized as permanent. 
5. Unlike the other components of aggregate demand, Russia's exports helped the economy 
to overcome the crisis faster, or alleviated the depression. The paramount importance of 
this sector for the Russian economy results from a fairly large export multiplier at this 
time. Simultaneously, data display a pretty high current account/GDP ratio and thus 
forgone opportunities to invest, since a portion of the domestic saving is being lent to 
foreigners. A privatization policy dedicated to more foreign direct investment might help to 
accelerate growth and to reduce net exports in favor of a higher domestic investment rate. 
6. The demand-side policies of the Central Bank caused a low broad money-to-GDP ratio, 
which indicates a restricted ability of the banking system to expand the monetary base via 
domestic credit supply. Individuals seem reluctant to entrust their money to banks 
because of low, or negative, real deposit rates. The elasticity of demand for deposits with 
respect to the interest rate is now less than unity, i.e. the public considers deposits as 
"inferior goods" of fading importance. A low currency/deposit ratio curbs the money 
stock and discourages investment. Banks offer low deposit rates in response to high 
refinance cost provoked by the interest rate policy of the Central bank. Until 1998 they 
passed these costs on to customers, requiring high lending rates, which suffocated the 
economy. 
7. Somewhat unexpectedly, the economy started to grow in 1999. This is due either to 
exogenous factors (windfall gains from rising raw material prices and the devaluation of 
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the ruble), or to cyclical reasons. While the exogenous factors might be understood as 
transitory, the cyclical effects could be of lasting importance. A closer look at the 
components of aggregate demand, however, casts doubt as to whether the improved shape 
of the economy is really durable. An analysis of investment demand has failed to prove 
that firms are considering prospects better and are intending to raise their capital stock on 
hand. Private consumption has not recovered, either, and hence cannot play any positive 
role in supporting output growth. 
8. Under such circumstances patterns of government spending and export demand become 
crucial. They have both increased and seem to be keeping aggregate demand on track. 
Were the transitory exogenous factors to fade away, government expenditures would, 
ceteribus paribus, have to contract because of the strong budget constraint. This may, 
along with a possible worsening of the terms of trade and a stronger ruble, undermine 
growth prospects. 
9. Nor is the money supply outcome a definite indication of oncoming sustained growth. An 
expanding money supply usually reflects depositors' confidence, resulting in more savings 
available for lending to investors and consumers by the banking system. The slow and 
deficient recovery of the currency/deposit ratio reflects an ongoing low household saving 
rate in Russia. Also, skepticism about the banking system continues, considering 
depositors' poor experience during the 1990s, let alone the fact that deposit rates are 
negative in real terms. Moreover, the Central Bank has injected money into the banking 
system which latter cannot lend out. Therefore, the additional liquidity (accompanied by 
higher mandatory reserves) has not helped to overcome the credit crunch. At this time, a 
small multiplier is limiting domestic credit expansion and simultaneously the output 
prospects. While in the past a looser monetary policy caused inflation, right now it has 
failed to accelerate the economy. 
10. Therefore, it is hard to assess whether the recent growth may be sustainable or not. Uncer-
tain exogenous factors require the cyclical factors – especially investor and consumer 
confidence – to rebound. Otherwise, the current output revitalization is likely to collapse. 
